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Abstract:  According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its 
origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He 
argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of 
matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no 
convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial 
attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, 
(i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the 
need for at least a small “miracle” in his and others’ models to instantiate sentience, I applaud a 
bottom-up approach such as Reber’s for our scientific investigation of consciousness. 
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I do not know how consciousness arose/arises and neither does anyone else I’ve encountered or 
tried to understand. Nevertheless, Reber’s (2016) Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model is 
a bottom-up, evolutionary approach that could lead to useful studies of the phenomenon of 
sentience in non-humans.  
 
The resistance to attempts to study conscious phenomena in animals has been strong, though it 
is easing. Donald R. Griffin’s (1976) small seminal book, The Question of Animal Awareness, 
inspired both appreciation (that a well-known, respected scientist had raised the issue again) 
and condemnations. One extreme opposing view called another of his books (Griffin, 1984) “The 
Satanic Verses of Animal Behavior” (noted in Griffin, 2001; Ristau, 2005). 
 
Notwithstanding the importance of scientific investigation of non-human sentience and the 
potential usefulness of Reber’s approach, I do disagree with several of his tenets. 
 
1. The Analogy to Physics. Reber states “Particular kinds of biological stuff carry with them 
particular properties” (p. 7). These properties are stated to be inherent, by analogy to gravity as 
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a property of mass: for example, “When you get nuclear particles you get the weak and strong 
nuclear forces; when you get mass you get the warp in space-time we call gravity; when you get 
electrons you get the electromagnetic force … and if there turn out to be more fundamental 
properties, if there is a deeper level, the argument would hold there instead” (p. 6).  
 
But gravity is not a property of mass. “The Higgs field gives particles mass, not gravity.” “Charges 
on quarks can be +1/3, - 1/3, +2/3 or - 2/3 [Electron Volts], i.e. less than the electron’s charge” 
(Hagopian, 2016, personal communication). The various forces are the stuff of physics that is to 
be investigated; they are not simply inherent properties. Recently, it was thought that a blip in a 
graph of high speed collisions at CERN might be the sought-after “graviton” that would help 
explain gravity, but it turned out to be just a blip, a statistical fluke (Overbye, 2016). Simply 
stating that sentience is a property of certain kinds of cells is likewise not an answer. 
 
2. Hardware Dependence. I (and others) do not agree that the actual stuff of consciousness 
needs to be biologically based, by which Reber seems to mean “living organic forms.” I do not 
mean that a programmed machine is likely to become conscious at some undetermined level of 
programming complexity, but I know no reason sentience needs to be carbon based. Perhaps it 
is so on this planet, but if important analogies are made to the physics of the universe, one must 
entertain the realms of the physically possible. 
 
3. Characteristics of a Cell. Reber writes about the cellular origin of consciousness: “Any 
organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion 
will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness (p. 4).” Sensitivity to 
surroundings does seem essential, but “flexibility” of the cell wall is problematic, for, at the 
least, cells grow, which requires some flexibility. Reber cites the work of Dener, Kacelnik & 
Shemesh (2016) showing that plants make risk-sensitive root-growth decisions, but he then 
excludes plants as potentially sentient beings because they lack endogenous locomotion. 
Locomotion is helpful to secure food, to escape, to reproduce. However, if, as is widely 
accepted, the origin of life forms indeed occurred in a primordial soup, then the need for 
locomotion is diminished. A fluid environment is likely to be moving. The liquid carries food. 
Cells and creatures would probably be dwelling in colonies, rather than in isolation. Thus an 
individual cell is safer in a colony because the other cell might be the one destroyed by a storm 
or eaten by a predator. A cell might be able to condense into a hard, inedible core for 
protection. Once they evolve, sperm or eggs can be transported to a nearby recipient. An 
alternative theory suggests that life (LUCA, the Last Universal Common Ancestor) might have 
originated in hydrothermal vents in the deep sea; it also makes a more convincing case for the 
evolution of the existent types of energy use and provides an even more dynamic environment 
(Weiss et al., 2016).  
 
However, once locomotion is no longer deemed a necessary characteristic of originator sentient 
entities, the possibility exists that non-animal entities — for example, plants and other early life 
forms — could be sentient. The originator, non-mobile entities would presumably find 
discriminatory abilities and sentience useful just as a mobile entity would. I am not proclaiming 
the existence of thinking and feeling plants. I simply note that we still do not have defining 
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criteria for the emergence or presence of sentience, so there is as yet no convincing reason why 
non-animal entities couldn’t be sentient. 
 
Plausibly, though, autonomously locomoting entities would face more pressures to have 
sentience, to “see/smell/feel/” their external environment, to evolve improved means to 
manage their locomotion, to be motivated for actions not only via stimulus-response 
mechanisms, but through some experienced state of being or emotion. No doubt non-
autonomously moving entities would also benefit from these capacities, but the case could be 
made that the likely complexities encountered by highly mobile autonomously moving entities 
could create additional pressures to promote sentience. 
 
Other researchers, for example, Feinberg & Mallatt (2016; Mallatt & Fenberg 2016), have 
suggested other criteria for the origin of sentience in an organism, deconstructing Chalmers’s 
(1995) “hard problem” into several concerns. However, in their scenario and Reber’s, we still 
need at least a “small miracle” to attain even an iota of sentient capacity. Chalmers’s “hard 
problem” has not been solved and it has not gone away.  
 
Nevertheless, unless we accept divine installation of some sentient capacity (e.g., Descartes, 
1649), an evolutionary framework is the only viable one. A top-down approach can sometimes 
be useful, perhaps adopting an intentional stance as I did in investigating the likely mentations 
of plovers protecting their eggs and young when performing broken-wing displays (aka “injury 
feigning”). Adopting that pragmatic approach helped me design experiments and gain new 
understanding of the plovers (Ristau, 1991). 
 
A bottom-up approach, however, has its own particular benefits, scientifically, intellectually and 
even morally (Harnad, 2016). Consciousness had to start somewhere. Evolution is practical and 
functional, most frequently building on what already exists.  
 
In this regard, I think that Woodruff’s (2016) comment that the bio-sensitivity underlying the 
locomotory mechanisms of bacteria with motor-driven flagella does not share genomic 
similarity with the neural mechanisms of sensing may be missing the essential point of Reber’s 
CBC model. One does not, I think, have to find genetic continuity in a particular sensing ability. If 
sentience is an inherent property of such biological material, it can promote the evolution of 
greater levels and kinds of sentience in that and other sensing abilities. Nor does Occam’s Razor 
destroy Reber’s arguments. Occam’s Razor is a suggested mode of conducting scientific inquiry 
and subsequent decision making regarding hypotheses. The simplest explanation is not “truth,” 
nor is it always the most adequate one. Organisms have multiple backup systems for their 
survival; even the most fundamental atomic physics is ever-more complex; “simple” 
explanations fall by the wayside. 
 
The plausibility of looking for consciousness at very low levels reminds one of Griffin’s (1976) 
proposal, then outrageous, that consciousness could be particularly helpful for a “small-
brained” creature such as an insect, in place of needing to have myriads of neural programs to 
account for all the situations they encounter and their adaptive responses.  




Whether the first beginnings of sentience were in any living entity or just in cells with the 
attributes proposed by Reber, or it began only in animals, or at the much higher levels 
suggested by Feinberg & Mallatt (2016), I do not know – nor, I think, does anyone today. 
However, more and more people – both scientists and non-scientists – appear to be recognizing 
that species others than our own are sentient and that the deeper we explore the issue, the 
further “down” we seem to be finding at least suggestions of that sentience. Sentience still 
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